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The recent interest of economists in knowledge-producing activities has
two main strands. The first is an attempt to explain the growth in the
measured productivity oftraditional factors ofproduction by incorporat-
ing research resources in production function and social accounting
frameworks (for a review see Griliches 1973, 1980). The second derives
from two fundamental characteristics ofknowledge as an economiccom-
modity, its low orzero cost ofreproduction andthedifficulty ofexcluding
others from its use. These features give knowledge the character of a
public good and suggest that the structure of market incentives may not
elicit thesociallydesirable level (orpattern) ofresearchanddevelopment
expenditures. In particular, it has been argued that market incentives
may create either underinvestment or overinvestment in knowledge-
producing activities (see Arrow 1962; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). To
investigate this possibility, economists have applied the techniques of
productivity analysis and estimated the private (andsocial) rate ofreturn
to research from production functions incorporating research resources
as a factor ofproduction. The estimates oftheprivate return for the late
1950s and early 1960s fall in the range of 30-45 percent.
1 Despite these
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high estimated private rates of return, the share of industrial resources
allocated to research expenditures did not increase over the succeeding
decade.
2 This suggests a paradox: Why has research effort not been
receiving more attentionfrom industrialfirms if the private rate ofreturn
to research is so attractive?
Two importantparametersin these calculationsofthe private returnto
research are the rate of decay of the private revenues accruing to the
industrially produced knowledge and the mean lag between the deploy-
ment ofresearch resources and the beginning ofthat stream ofrevenues.
These parameters, of course, are necessary ingredients in any study
involving a measurementofthestockofprivatelymarketable knowledge.
The rate of decay in the returns of research has not previously been
estimated. In this paperwe present a method ofexplicitly estimating that
parameter. We also use information provided by others to calculate the
approximate meanR&D gestation lags. Since previous research has not
included the latter and seems to have seriously understated the rate of
decay of appropriable revenues in calculations of the private rate of
return to research expenditures, we then use ourestimates to improve on
previous results on this rate of return.
Ofcourse, all previous work in this area has been forced to make some
assumption, either implicit or explicit, about the value ofthe decay rate.
The problem arises because it has been assumed to be similar to the rate
ofdecay in thephysicalproductivity oftraditional capital goods. The fact
thatthe rate ofdeterioration oftraditionalcapital and the rateofdecay in
appropriable revenues from knowledge arise from two different sets of
circumstances seems to have been ignored.
3
The employment ofresearch resources by a private firm produces new
knowledge, with some gestation lag. The new knowledge or innovation
may be a cost-reducing process, a product, or some combination of the
two. The knowledge-producing firm earns a return either through net
revenues from the sale ofits own output embodying the new knowledge,
or by license and nonmonetary returns collected from other firms which
lease the innovation. Since the private rate ofreturn to research depends
onthepresentvalue ofthe revenues accruing to thesale ofthe knowledge
produced, the conceptually appropriate rate ofdepreciation is the rate at
which the appropriable revenues decline for the innovating firm. How-
ever, as Boulding (1966) noted, knowledge, unlike traditional capital,
2. The share of net sales of manufacturing firms devoted to total R&D (publicly and
company funded) actually declined from 0.046 in 1963 to 0.029 in 1974, or by about 40
percent, though the share devoted to company-funded R&D remained constant at 0.019.
See National Science Foundation, (1976, table B-36).
3. The commonly assumed rate ofdecay ofthe knowledge produced by firms is between
0.04 and0.07 (Mansfield 1968). Griliches (1980), noting some ofthe conceptual distinctions
between the rates ofdecayin traditional capital and in research, assumes an upperboundof
0.10 for the latter.(1)
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does notobeythelaws of(physical) conservation. Therateofdecayin the
revenues accruing to the producerofthe innovation derives notfrom any
decay in theproductivityofknowledge butratherfrom two relatedpoints
regarding its market valuation, namely, that it is difficult to maintain the
ability to appropriate the benefits from knowledge and that new innova-
tions are developed which partly orentirely displace the original innova-
tion. Indeed, the very use ofthe knew knowledge in any productive way
will tend to spread and reveal it to other economic agents, as will the
mobility of scientific personnel. One might expect then that the rate of
decay of appropriable revenues would be quite high, and certainly con-
siderably greater than the rate ofdeterioration in the physical productiv-
ity of traditional capital.4
In section 4.1 we examine two independent pieces ofevidence bearing
on the rate of decay of appropriable revenues. The information from
various sources on the mean lag between R&D expenditures and the
beginning ofthe associated revenue stream is summarized in section 4.2.
In section 4.3 we attempt to get a rough ideaofhow seriously the existing
estimates of the private rate of return to research overstate the true
private rate of return. Brief concluding remarks follow.
4.1 The Rate of Decay of Appropriable Revenues
The first piece of evidence on the rate of decay of appropriable rev-
enues (hereafter, the rate of decay) is based on data presented in Fede-
rico (1958). Federico provides observations on the percentage ofpatents
of various ages which were renewed by payment of mandatory annual
renewal fees during 1930-39 in the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland. A theoretical model ofpatentrenewal
will lead directly to a procedure for estimating the rate of decay from
these data.
Consider a patented innovation whose annual renewal requires pay-
ment of a stipulated fee. Letting ret) and e(t) denote the appropriable
revenues and the renewal fee in year t, the discounted value of net
revenues accruing to the innovation over its life span, VeT), is
T
VeT) == f [ret) - e(t)]e-itdt,
a
where i is the discount rate and T is the expiration date of the patent.
4. The models used in this paper do not assume that the rate of decay in appropriable
revenues is exogenous to the firm's decision-making process. In a dynamic context, a firm
processing an innovation has to choose between increasing present revenues and inducing
entry, and charging smaller royalties to forestall entry. This choice is the basis ofGaskins's
(1971) dynamic limit pricing analysis of situations involving temporary monopoly power.
The Gaskins model can be used to show that the optimal revenue stream will decline over
time and that the rate of decline will depend on certain appropriability parameters.76 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
Differentiating (1) with respect to T, the optimumexpiration date, T*, is
written implicitly as
(2) r(T*) = e(T*),
providedthatr'(t) < e'(t) for all t. Equivalently, theconditionfor renewal
ofthe patentin year t is thatthe annual revenue at least covers the costof
the renewal fee
(3) ret) 2:e(t).
Letthe annual renewalfee grow at rateg, and the appropriable revenues
decline at rate 8. Then condition (3) can be written as
(4) r(0) 2:e(O)e(g +8)t.
Allowing for differences in the initial appropriable revenues among
patents, and lettingf(r) represent the density function ofthe distribution
of their values, the percentage ofpatents renewed in each year, P(t), isS
00
(5) pet) = J f(r)dr,
e(t)
where C(t) = eoe(g+ 8)t. It follows that
(6a)
and
(6b)
P'(t) = - C'(t)f(C) ,
P"(t) = - f(C)C"(t)[1 + Cf '(C)]
f(C) ,
where the primes denote derivatives. That is, as long as (g + 8) > 0, the
percentage ofpatents renewed will decline with their age. The curvature
of P(t), however, will d,epend on the distribution of the values of the
innovations patented.
6 For example, if fer) is lognormal, pet) will have
onepointofinflection, beingconcave beforeit andconvexthereafter(see
curve 1, fig. 4.1). Alternatively, Scherer (1965) cites evidence presented
in Sanders, Rossman, and Harris (1958) which indicates that the value of
patents tends to follow a Pareto-Levy distribution. Iff(r) is Pareto-Levy,
pet) will be a strictly decreasing convex function ofpatent age, as shown
by figure 4.1, curve 2. Figure 4.2 presents the actual time paths of pet)
5. We are implicitly assuming that the rate of decay of appropriable revenues, 8, does
not differ among patented innovations. This assumption allows us to compare directly our
estimate of8 to those assumed in previous empirical work (since the same implicit assump-
tion is prevalent in that work) and to consider the economic implications of the different
values of 8 (see section 4.3). The model could be generalized to allow for differences in
decay rates and, if sufficient data were available, one could estimate the parameters ofthe
joint distribution of the values of the initial revenues and the decay rates.
6. Since the value of patents (eq. [1]) is a monotonic transformation of the adjusted
initial revenues, we shall use the two terms interchangeably.77 Obsolescence, Research Lags, Rate of Return to Research
P(t)
Curve 2
Curve 1
t
Fig. 4.1
from Federico (1958). Four ofthe five curves tend to support Sanders et
al.'s data and are consistent with an underlying Pareto-Levy distribution
ofpatentvalues. The time pathfor Germany, however, indicates thatthe
underlying distribution for that country has at least one mode. Since it is
futile to estimate both the parameters of the underlying lognormal (for
example) andthedecay ratein appropriablerevenuesfrom onlyeighteen
observations available on Germany, we shall disregard the German data
in the remainder of this empirical work.? -
We now use this simplified model to obtain rough estimates of the
decay rate of appropriable revenues 8. Consistent with the evidence in
figure 4.2, the relative density function ofinitial revenue is takento be of
the Pareto-Levy type:
(7) fer) = ~r~r-(r3+1), rm>O,~>O,
7. TheUnitedKingdom patentsystem requires no renewal paymentsuntil the fifth year.
Hence, the underlying distribution of patent values may have an inflection point, but it
cannot be ascertained from the data.78 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
P(t)
Kingdom
___--------------------------t
Fig. 4.2
where rm is theminimumvalue ofr in thepopulation. Using equations (5)
and (7), the percentage ofpatents renewed in year t can be expressed as
(8) pet) = (rm/CO)~e-~(g+O)t.
Two errorterms differentiate theobservedvalue ofthelogarithmofPt ,
log P,:, from the value predicted by equation (8).8 The first, VI, is a
samplingormeasurementerror, while the second, V2, is astructuralerror
in the model. Assuming that P': is derived from a binomial sampling
process around the actual value, that is, P':~b(Pt, N), it follows that
(J2 = V(log pm) ~1 - Pt
VI t PtN'
where N is the (unobserved) number of patents sampled. The structural
8. Since Pt is bounded by zero and unity, the cOlnposite error cannot be independently
and identically distributed. The analysis which follows corresponds closely to the treatment
ofsimilarproblemsin logitregressions. See Berkson(1953) and Amemiyaand Nold (1975).79 Obsolescence, Research Lags, Rate of Return to Research
error, V2, will be assumed to be an independent, identically distributed
normal deviate with variance 0-2.
Letting j index a country, for sufficiently large Nj the logarithmic
transform of Ptj can be written as
(9) log P/j = CiOj + Ciljtj + f-1tj,
where f-1tj ~ N[O, 0-
2 + (1 - Ptj)/PtjNj], Cilj = - ~j(gj + 8j), and CiOj =
~)og (rm/CO)j' The estimating question (9) embodies the basic prediction
of the model, namely a negative relationship between Cilj and gj, where
the slope coefficient is the parameter of the underlying distribution of
patent values.
ConsistentestimatesofCiOj, Cilj and theirstandarderrorscanbe derived
from the following two-stage procedure. First, estimate (9) by ordinary
leastsquares. Next, define e2 as thesquaredresidualsfrom (9) andregress
2 2 1 1 - P'!]
(10) etj = 0- +---m-'
N j Ptj
Letting P be the fitted value from (10), use P- Yz to weight and perform
weighted least squares on (9).
If our model is correct, and if ~ and 8 do not vary between countries,
then
(11)
Since gj' the rate of growth of renewal fees, is available from Federico's
data,9 (11) can be tested by using p-Y2 to weight and by performing
weighted least squares on the equation
(12) log Pij= CiOj - ~8tj - ~(gjtj) + f-1tj,
where all symbols are as defined above.
If (11) is the true specification, then minus twice the logarithm of the
likelihood ratio from (12) and the weighted least-squares version of (9)
will distribute asymptotically as a X~ deviate. Moreover, equation (12)
will provide estimates ofboth the rate ofdecay ofappropriable revenues
(8) and the underlying distribution of patent values (~).
Table 4.1 summarizes the empirical results. The observed value ofthe
X
2 test statistic is 5.4, while the 5 percent critical value is 5.99. Though a
little high, the test statistic does indicate acceptance ofthe hypothesis in
(11). Theestimatesofl/Nj and 0-
2 are all positive therebylendingsupport
to the weighting procedure described above.
Turning to the parameters of interest, the point estimate of ~ is 0.57
9. These growth rates were calculated from a semilog linear regression ofcosts against
time for eachcountry. Thegrowth rates (and theirstandarderrors) for the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland were 0.085, (0.002), 0.129 (0.015), 0.089
(0.006), and 0.143 (0.008), respectively.80 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
Table 4.1 Estimates from the Patent Renewal Modela,b
Country-Specific Parameters
Common Parameters
(57 observations) o.Oj 1/~
(3& 0.14 France 0.04 0.00014
(0.01) (0.02)
~ 0.57 United Kingdom 0.55 0.00016
(0.07) (0.02)
& Netherlands 0.09 0.00040
Point estimate
C 0.25
(0.02)
Confidence interval
d 0.18-0.36
Switzerland 0.32 0.00032
(12 0.0002
(0.02)
R
2 0.996
aThe data on patent renewal are taken from Federico (1958). These datacover the percent-
age ofpatentsofdifferent ages in force during 193G-39whichwere renewedby paymentofa
mandatory annual renewal fee. For example, if a patent was granted in 1925, it would
appear in the data as five years old in 1930, six years old in 1931, and so <?n. Therefore, the
percentageofpatents renewed afterfive years is basedon the total numberofpatentsissued
five years earlier in a particular country.
bStandard errors are in parentheses.
A A A
C& = (3S/~.
dThe confidence interval corresponds to the 95 percent Fieller bounds on &.
with a standard error of 0.07. One can check this estimate against an
independentsource ofinformation: as mentionedearlier, Sanders, Ross-
man, and Harris (1958) provide evidence on the distribution ofthe value
ofpatentsin theUnitedStates. Fittinga Pareto-Levydistributionto these
data, we obtain a point estimate for f3 of 0.63 with a standard error of
0.06. That is, the estimate of f3 from Sanders et al.'s data is very close to
that obtained using our model and Federico's data.
lO
Our primary interest is in 8, the (average) decay rate in appropriable
revenues. The point estimate of8 is 0.25, while a 95 percent confidence
intervalplaces thetruevalue of8between0.18 and0.36.
11 Anestimated8
10. These data correspond to appropriable revenues minus costs associated with the
patent, but since cost data were not available we were'forced to use net value data. A
cumulative Pareto-Levydistribution was fitted to the five positive net value observationson
expiredpatentswhichtherefore have observable netvalues. TheR2 from this regressionwas
0.97. Note that Pareto-Levy distributions with ~ < 1 do not have either a finite mean or
variance and hence do not behave according to the law oflarge numbers. Therefore, if the
distribution ofpatentvalues approximates the distribution ofproject values, diversification
into many independent projects will not reduce risk. This point was originally made by
Nordhaus (1969). Of course, if the returns to different projects are negatively correlated,
diversification may still reduce risk.
11. Note that since the estimate of 8 is obtained as the ratio of two coefficients, its
confidence interval (obtained by using Fieller bounds) is not symmetric around its point
estimate. Two remarks on the robustness of these results are also in order. First, the
assumption thatthe revenue streamcan be described by an exponential rate ofdecaycan be81 Obsolescence, Research Lags, Rate of Return to Research
of 0.25, though consistent with theoretical arguments concerning the
unique characteristics ofknowledge as an economic commodity, implies
that earlier researchers have assumed values ofBwhich are far too small.
In particular, the lower bound ofthe 95 percent confidence interval for B
is nearly twice the maximum value ofthe rate ofdecay ofprivate returns
used in previous research.
Of course, our estimate of Bmay reflect some sample selection bias.
The rate of decay of patented innovations may differ from that of all
innovations. The directionofthebiasis indeterminatesince it dependson
the correlation between the patent selection process and the rates of
obsolescence in the universe of all innovations. However, the estimates
ofBmay be biased downward for two reasons: First, the fact that patents
create property rights in the embodied knowledge may result in a lower
rate of obsolescence for those patentable innovations. Second, given a
patentable innovation, it is easy to show that the innovator will actually
take out a patent only if patenting lowers the rate ofdecay. As we show
presently, however, evidence of a completely different nature suggests
that whatever bias exists is negligible.
The second source of evidence on the magnitude of the decay rate of
appropriable revenues is derived from data presented in Wagner (1968)
on the life span of applied research and development expenditures.
Survey data on applied research and development were collected from
about thirty-five firms with longR&Dexperiencein thirty-threeproduct
fields, using the product field ·description employed by the National
Science Foundation (NSF) in its annual industry reports. Included in the
surveywas a question onthe life span ofR&D defined as theperiodafter
which the product of the R&D was "virtually obsolete."
This definition does not correspond directly to the decline in the
appropriable revenues accruing to research and development. However,
a rough correspondence can be established by assuming that R&D is
virtually obsolete when the appropriable revenues reach some small
fraction of the initial value, and then by experimenting with different
fractions to examine the sensitivity of the implied decay rate to the
assumption. Table4.2presentsthe average life spanofR&Dfor durable
and nondurable product field categories, product- and process-oriented
R&D, and the implied decay rates based on various reasonable defini-
tions ofvirtual obsolescence. While the implied decay rates do vary with
viewed as a first-order (logarithmic) approximation to a more general stream of reve-
nue. We also experimented with a second-order approximation, namely, r(t) =
r(O)exp(At + Bt2). The estimates ofB and its standarderrorwere bothzero to two decimal
places and the rest of the results were almost identical to those reported here. Apparently
market-induced obsolescence is well approximated by an exponential pattern. Griliches
(1963) reaches the same conclusion with respect to the obsolescence component of the
deterioration in the value of traditional capital goods. Second, the results from the un-
weighted version of(12) yielded a point estimate of8 = 0.22, withFiellerbounds of0.16 to
0.33, and an estimate of r3 = 0.62.82 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
Table 4.2 Estimates of 8 from Average Life Span of R & Da,b
Ratio of Revenue in Year T to Initial Revenue
("virtual obsolescence")
0.15 0.10 0.05
Durable goods R&D
Product (T = 9) 0.21 0.26 0.33
Process (T = 11) 0.17 0.21 0.27
Nondurable goods R&D
Product (T = 9) 0.21 0.26 0.33
Process (T = 8) 0.24 0.29 0.38
aTaken from Wagner (1968, p. 196, table 5), which refers to "appliedresearch and develop-
ment" (AR & D). These life span figures (denoted by T in parentheses) are averages of
survey responses, weighted by 1965 product-field expenditures and by frequencies of the
response distribution.
bCalculated as S = - (log x)/T, where x is the assumed ratio of revenue in year T to initial
revenue accruing to the R&D.
the definition ofvirtual obsolescence, the rate ofvalues is nearlyidentical
to the FieBer bounds on cin table 4.1.
12
The responses offirms to Wagner's question can also be used to check
the reasonablenessoftherates ofobsolescencecommonly assumed in the
literature. If in fact c == .05 (.10), that would imply (using T == 9 from
table4.2) thatfirms considertheproductoftheirR&Dvirtually obsolete
even though the annual revenue flow is still 64 (41) percent of its initial
value. This seems highly implausible and casts additional doubt on the
conventionally assumed values of c.
4.2 Mean R&D Lags
Two independentsourcesofinformation are usedto estimatethe mean
R&D lags, defined as the average time between the outlay ofan R&D
dollar and the beginning of the associated revenue stream. This lag
consists of a mean lag between project inception and completion (the
gestation lag), and the time from project completion to commercial
application (the application lag).
Rapoport (1971) presents detailed data on the distribution ofcosts and
time for forty-nine commercialized innovations and the total innovation
time for a subset ofsixteen ofthem in three product groups-chemicals,
machinery, and electronics. The innovation process is decomposed into
12. The only other estimate of the decay rate is produced knowledge of which we are
aware is reported in a footnote in Griliches (1980). A regression of productivity growth
against R&D flow and stock intensity variables in his microdata set yielded an estimated S
of0.31. Griliches points out the discrepancy between this result and the rest ofhis analysis
but offers no reconciliation.83 Obsolescence, Research Lags, Rate of Return to Research
Table 4.3 Estimates of the Mean R&D Lag (years)
R&D Application Total
Gestation Lag Lag Lag
Rapoport
Chemicals 1.48 0.24 1.72
Machinery 2.09 0.31 2.40
Electronics 0.82 0.35 1.17
Wagner
Durables 1.15 1.47 2.62
Nondurables 1.14 1.03 2.17
Source: Calculated from data contained in Rapoport (1971) and Wagner (1968).
five stages: applied research, specification, prototype or pilot plant,
tooling and manufacturing facilities, and manufacturing and marketing
start-up. Since the expenditures on manufacturing and marketing start-
up are notincludedin the NSFdefinition ofR&D expenditures, thetime
involvedin thatstage is treatedhere as theapplicationlag. Theremaining
data are used to calculate the gestation lag. The first part of table 4.3
summarizes the R&D gestation and application lags for the three
product groups.13
Additional information on the average R&D and application lags is
provided in Wagner (1968). Survey data on process- and product-
oriented R&D were gathered from about thirty-six firms with long R &
D experience in a variety of durable and nondurable goods industries.
Included was information on the duration of applied research and de-
velopment, project duration for projects successfully completed in 1966,
the distribution of R&D expenditures for successfully completed pro-
jects classified by project duration, the percentage of total funds
accounted for by projects abandoned before completion together with
the time of abandonment, and the interval between the completion of
R&D and commercial application of the innovations. These data are
used to calculate both an application lag and a mean gestation lag which,
unlikethose basedonRapoport'sdata, takeintoaccountexpenditures on
both technically successful and unsuccessful projects. The results are
given in the second part of table 4.3.
The gestation lags based on Wagner's data are broadly similar to those
13. The details of the calculations are omitted here for the sake of brevity but are
available on request. However, the limitations ofthese estimates should be noted. First, all
the projects analyzed by Rapoport resulted in significant innovations, and as Scherer (1965)
and Mansfield (1968) have noted, mean lags tend to be longer for more significant technical
advances. Second, we have not taken into account the time overlap between stages, which,
according to Rapoport, is considerable. Both of these factors would tend to cause upward
biases in ourestimates ofthe mean lag, e. On the otherhand, the R&D costs oftechnically
unsuccessful projects should be taken into account, which would tend to raise the estimates
of e.84 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
derived from Rapoport, but the application lags are considerably
longer,14 causingsomediscrepancy betweenthe two setsofresults. Mans-
field (1968), using data gathered from extensive personal interviews with
R&D project evaluation staff, concluded that the mean application lag
was about 0.53 years. Substitution of this number for Wagner's would
bring the two sets ofresults closer together and put the total lag at about
1.75 years. Forpresentpurposes, however, a range ofvalues between 1.2
and 2.5 years is good enough. IS
4.3 Implications for Measuring the Private Rate of
Return to Investment in Research
Theprecedingsectionsofthispaperprovideestimatesofthedecayrate
and the meanR&D lag whose values are substantiallyhigher than those
assumed in previous research. These estimates are now used to get a
rough indication ofthe implications for production function estimates of
the private rate of return to research expenditures.
Let QR denote the increment in value added (or sales) generated by a
unit increase in research resourceseyears earlier. Then the equation for
the private (internal) rate of return to investment in research is
(13) ear == f QRe- (r+ 8)7'd'T ,
o
where eand 8 were defined earlier, and r is the private rate of return or
theimplicitdiscountratethatwouldmakeinvestmentinresearch margin-
ally profitable. Integrating (13) yields the following nonlinear equation
for r:
(14)
In the special case wheree == 0, this reduces to r == QR - 8, correspond-
ing to the equation used by previous researchers.
Given estimates of QR, 0, and e, we can compute the private rate of
return from equation (14). Two points should be noted. First, since
research expenditures are usually included in the measures oftraditional
capital and labor expenditures in the production functions used to esti-
mate QR, the private rates ofreturn to research reported in the literature
14. Since Wagner does not precisely define the "endofAR & D" or the "application of
innovations," some caution should be exercised in interpretating the application lags.
Wagner does indicate that the longer application interval in durables reflects in large part
the defense-space-atomic-energy-orientedfields, so that the application lag for otherindus-
tries is probably closer to the nondurable estimate. On the other hand, Rapoport's "manu-
facturing and marketing start-up" stage may understate the actual application lag.
15. The maximum ofthis range is considerably shorter than the midpoint ofthe interval
betweenprojectinceptionandmarketing, reflecting the fact thatthe distributionofresearch
expenditures on projects is considerably skewed to the left.85 Obsolescence, Research Lags, Rate of Return to Research
represent excess returns above and beyond the normal remuneration to
traditional factors (see Griliches 1973). To avoid this problem, we base
the calculations on estimates of QR corrected for this double-counting
(Schankerman 1981). Second, these estimates of QR are calculated by
multiplying the estimated sales (value added) elasticity of the stock of
knowledge times theratio ofsales to thestockofknowledge. Thestockof
knowledge is taken as the undepreciated sum of research expenditures
over the period ofobservation. For the calculations in (14) to be consist-
ent, however, the stock of knowledge must be calculated according to
declining balance depreciation. We therefore calculate the depreciated
sumofresearchexpenditureswith a decayrateof8andthenuse thisstock
ofknowledge to convertthe estimatedsales elasticityinto a value of QR. 16
This has been done for three values of 8, corresponding to the point
estimate and Fieller bounds obtained earlier (0.18,0.25, and 0.36), and
for three different values of QR (0.30, 0.35, and 0.40), corresponding to
the pooled (across industries) point estimate plus or minus one standard
deviation computedfrom Schankerman (1981). Theresults arepresented
in table 4.4 for 8 == 2.
Turning to the results, it is apparent that the net private rates ofreturn
to investment in research are greatly reduced by our adjustments. The
net private rate of return varies between .075 and .174. If the !lormal
(net) rate of return to traditional capital is about 0.08 (Griliches 1980),
this implies risk premiumsfor investmentin researchofbetweenzero and
about 9 percent. In view of the abnormal riskiness associated with re-
search expenditures, these risk premiums appear modest.
Inshort, table 4.4suggests thatthe private ratesofreturn to investment
in research and traditional capital are roughly equated at the margin.
Another way ofchecking this possibility is to ask: What is the decay rate
ofappropriable revenues implied by the assumption that firms equate, at
the margin, the private rates of return to investment in research and
traditional capital? With a mean R&D lag of 8, the return to a dollar of
research is (r + 8 + 1)(1 + r) -8, while for traditional capital, with
depreciation rate 8e, it is (r + 8e + 1). Using 8e == 0.06 and r == 0.08 from
16. We thank Zvi Griliches for pointing out this problem and suggesting a solution. The
data for the calculations are taken from the National Science Foundation (1976), table B-l.
Threeadditionalpointsshouldbe noted. First, Schankerman'sestimatesofQRare basedon
the large microdata set used by Griliches (1980). Griliches's (uncorrected) pooled estimate
ofQRwas about0.30, while his estimates for research intensive and nonintensive industries
were 0.40 and 0.20, respectively. Mansfield's (uncorrected) estimates, averaged over the
ten firms he used, range from about 0.20 to 0.30, depending on the specific assumptions
made. Second, if private returns to knowledge do in fact decay, there is an error in the
measuredstock ofknowledge used as an independentvariable in the regressions to estimate
QR' However, it can be shown that the ratio of the variance in measurement error to the
variance in the truestockis very small (less than0.0026), so thesaleselasticityofthestockof
knowledge can be taken directly from Schankerman's regressions. Finally, the private rates
of return are much less sensitive to ethan to 8.86 Ariel Pakes/Mark Schankerman
Table 4.4 Estimates of the Net Private Rate ofReturn to Research (0 = 2)
8
.18
.25
.36
.30
.090
.111
.075
.35
.118
.144
.107
.40
.144
.174
.139
Griliches (1980), thevalue of0which equatesthese two terms is 0 = 0.25
ife = 2.0. This value is identical to the point estimate of 0 in table 4.1.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we stress the conceptual distinction between the rates of
decay in the physical productivity oftraditional capital goods and that of
the appropriable revenues which accrue to knowledge-producing activi-
ties. An estimate of the private rate of obsolescence of knowledge is
necessaryin any study which requires constructing a stock of privately
marketable knowledge. Weestimatethis parameterfrom a simple patent
renewal model andfind the estimatecomparableto evidence provided by
firms onthelife spanoftheoutputoftheirR&Dactivities. Theempirical
results indicate that the rate ofobsolescence is considerably greater than
the rates typically assumed in the literature. The estimated decay rates,
together with mean R&D gestation lags, are used to calculate the net
private rate ofreturn to investment in research. Our results suggest that
the private rate of return to research expenditures, at least in the early
1960s, was notunreasonablyhigh. Itis importantto emphasize, however,
that to draw conclusions regarding the divergence between the private
and social rates ofreturn to knowledge-producing activities, information
onthesocial rate ofreturn must be added to theinformationcontainedin
this paper. I? Nonetheless, if our calculations ofthe private rate of return
areeven approximatelycorrect, theydo suggest a partialresolution to the
paradox presented in the introduction to this paper: Why did private
firms not increase the share of their resources devoted to R&D if their
previous research efforts were so highly profitable? Part of the answer
may be that research was not as privately profitable as has been thought.
17. In this connection, the social rate ofdecay may well be smaller than the rate ofdecay
ofappropriable revenues. See Hirshleifer's (1971) distinction between real and distributive
effects in the production of knowledge.87 Obsolescence, Research Lags,Rate of Return to Research
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